While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. The accords, which were signed by other participants including the Viet Minh, mandated a temporary ceasefire line, which separated southern and northern Vietnam to be governed by the State of Vietnam an The North Vietnamese turned for shore with the Maddox in pursuit. 8. One element of American assistance to South Vietnam included covert support for South Vietnamese commando raids against North Vietnams coastal transportation facilities and networks. On 7 August, the Senate passed the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, allowing the administration greater latitude in expanding the war by a vote of 88 to 2. In late 2007, that information was finally made public when an official National Security Agency (NSA) history of signals intelligence (SIGINT) in Vietnam, written in 2002, was released in response to a Freedom of Information Act request. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. 3. This article by Capt. The Secret Side of the Tonkin Gulf Incident, 2. Media Manipulation. This is another government conspiracy that's true. President, weve just had a report from the commander of that task force out there The report is that they have observed and we don't know by what means two unidentified vessels and three unidentified prop aircraft in the vicinity of the destroyers, McNamara told the president. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Message, COMUSMACV 291233Z July 1964, CP 291345Z July 1964. Subscribe now and never hit a limit. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. 4. No actual visual sightings by Maddox.". For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. The only solution was to get rid of the evidence. It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. It reveals what commanders actually knew, what SIGINT analysts believed and the challenges the SIGINT community and its personnel faced in trying to understand and anticipate the aggressive actions of an imaginative, deeply committed and elusive enemy. Shortly thereafter, the Phu Bai station intercepted the signal indicating the North Vietnamese intended to conduct a torpedo attack against the enemy. Phu Bai issued a Critic Reportshort for critical message, meaning one that had priority over all other traffic in the communications system to ensure immediate deliveryto all commands, including Maddox. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. As the torpedo boats continued their high-speed approach, Maddox was ordered to fire warning shots if they closed inside 10,000 yards. U.S. soldiers recall Cam Ranh as a sprawling logistic center for materiel bolstering the war effort, but in the summer of 1964 it was only a junk force training base near a village of farmers and fishermen. Although the total intelligence picture of North Vietnams actions and communications indicates that the North Vietnamese did in fact order the first attack, it remains unclear whether Maddox was the originally intended target. Illumination rounds shot skyward, catching the patrol boats in their harsh glare. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). WebNational Security Agency/Central Security Service > Home At 0354 on 2 August, the destroyer was just south of Hon Me Island. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense But in the pre-dawn hours of July 31, 1964, U.S.-backed patrol boats shelled two North The disclaimer is required, if for no other reason than because of Chapter 15, "The American Response to the Gulf of Tonkin Attacks," about which more later. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). The ships gunners used the standard 5 mil offset to avoid hitting the boats. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. A North Vietnamese patrol boat also trailed the American ships, reporting on their movements to Haiphong. Reinforced by Turner Joy, Herrick returned to the area on Aug. 4. The Johnson administration had made the first of several secret diplomatic attempts during the summer of 1964 to convince the North Vietnamese to stop its war on South Vietnam, using the chief Canadian delegate to the ICC, J. Blair Seaborn, to pass the message along to Hanoi. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. PTF-2 had mechanical troubles and had to turn back, but the other boats made it to their rendezvous point off the coast from Vinh Son. For some reason, however, the second Desoto Mission, to be conducted by Maddox, was not canceled, even though it was scheduled to start at the same time that a late July commando mission was being launched. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Hanoi was more than willing to tell the world about the attacks, and it took either a fool or an innocent to believe that the United States knew nothing about the raids. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. McNamara was ready to respond. When the enemy boats closed to less than 10,000 yards, the destroyer fired three shots across the bow of the lead vessel. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. When the contacts appeared to turn away at 6,000 yards, Maddoxs crew interpreted the move as a maneuver to mark a torpedo launch. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. McNamara did not mention the 34A raids.15. JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter. When Did the U.S. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. Moreover, the subsequent review of the evidence exposed the translation and analysis errors that resulted in the reporting of the salvage operation as preparations for a second attack. He is the author of. What will be of interest to the general reader is the treatment of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. When the boats reached that point, Maddox fired three warning shots, but the torpedo boats continued inbound at high speed. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident. AIDS Brotherhood Symbology The Illuminati Flame . Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. Media reporting on the NSA reports assessments sparked a brief rehash of the old arguments about the Gulf of Tonkin. 4. As is common with specialized histories -- what I call the "tunnels of Cu Chi" syndrome -- this book will tell most readers more about the U.S. Navy in Vietnam than they care to know. The battle was over in 22 minutes. Carl Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy intelligence officer with 10 years of experience as a surface line officer. The series of mistakes that led to the August 4 misreporting began on August 3 when the Phu Bai station interpreted Haiphongs efforts to determine the status of its forces as an order to assemble for further offensive operations. For the Navys official account stating that both incidents occurred and that 34A and Desoto were "entirely distinct," see Marolda and Fitzgerald, pp. Related:LBJ knew the Vietnam War was a disaster in the making. Forty-eight hours earlier, on Aug. 2, two US destroyers on patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin the Maddox and the Turner Joy were attacked by North Vietnamese boats. Both were perceived as threats, and both were in the same general area at about the same time. Here's why he couldn't walk away. Retrieved from https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. IV-2 to IV-4. 17. They issued a recall order from Haiphong to the port commander and communications relay boat two hours after the torpedo boat squadron command issued its attack order. With that report, after nearly four decades, the NSA officially reversed its verdict on the events of August 4, 1964, that had led that night to President Lyndon Johnsons televised message to the nation: The initial attack on the destroyer Maddox, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. We still seek no wider war.. 1, p. 646. At about the same time, there were other "secret" missions going on. Simultaneously, U.S. SIGINT was placed on increased alert to monitor indications of future North Vietnamese threats to the Desoto Missions, and additional air and naval forces were deployed to the Western Pacific. After several early failures, it was transferred to the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group in 1964, at which time its focus shifted to maritime operations. The U.S. in-theater SIGINT assets were limited, as was the number of Vietnamese linguists. To the northwest, though they could not see it in the blackness, was Hon Me; to the southwest lay Hon Nieu. Although Washington officials did not believe Hanoi would attack the Desoto ships again, tensions ran high on both sides, and this affected their respective analyses of the events to come. Alerted to the threat, Herrick requested air support from the carrier USS Ticonderoga. Americas Vietnam War had begun in earnest. Taking evasive action, they fired on numerous radar targets. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. SOG took the mounting war of words very seriously and assumed the worstthat an investigation would expose its operations against the North. The North also protested the South Vietnamese commando raid on Hon Me Island and claimed that the Desoto Mission ships had been involved in that raid. This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. 15. This was the only time covert operations against the North came close to being discussed in public. However, planes from the aircraft carrier Ticonderoga (CVA-14) crippled one of the boats and damaged the other two. Both the Phu Bai station and Maddoxs DSU knew the boats had orders to attack an enemy ship., Not knowing about the South Vietnamese commando raid, all assumed that Maddox was the target. 10. Keep supporting great journalism by turning off your ad blocker. The secondary mission of the Gulf of Tonkin patrols was to assert American freedom of navigation in international waters. Based on this, they launched the political process that led to the wars escalation. Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. The North Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs made all this clear in September when it published a "Memorandum Regarding the U.S. War Acts Against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the First Days of August 1964." The North Vietnamese coastal radars also tracked and reported the positions of U.S. aircraft operating east of the ships, probably the combat air patrol the Seventh Fleet had ordered in support. And, of course, McNamara himself knew about the "South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands," but his cautiously worded answer got him out of admitting it. The U.S. ships were supposed to remain well outside North Vietnams claimed five nautical mile territorial limit. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. . A firewall existed between covert patrol-boat attacks on North Vietnamese positions and Desoto patrols eavesdropping on shore-based communications. Consequently, while Maddox was in the patrol area, a South Vietnamese commando raid was underway southwest of its position. This volume deals only with the former. The Navys seaborne SIGINT effort in support of OPLAN-34, called Desoto Missions, played a key role in the events that ultimately led to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. Senator Wayne Morse (D-OR) challenged the account, and argued that despite evidence that 34A missions and Desoto patrols were not operating in tandem, Hanoi could only have concluded that they were. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. Subscribe to receive our weekly newsletter with top stories from master historians. In the end the Navy agreed, and in concert with MACV, took steps to ensure that "34A operations will be adjusted to prevent interference" with Desoto patrols.7 This did not mean that MACV did not welcome the information brought back by the Desoto patrols, only that the two missions would not actively support one another. The electronic intercept traffic cited here is too voluminous to permit a conclusion that somehow everything was the figment of the collective imaginations on both sides. It was 20 minutes into the new day, 31 July, when PTF-3 and PTF-6, both under the command of Lieutenant Sonconsidered one of the best boat skippers in the covert fleetreached Hon Me and began their run at the shore. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. Subsequent research and declassified documents have essentially shown that the second attack did not happen. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. The Dollar Bill . The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. The United States denied involvement. Thus, the South Vietnamese raid on Hon Me Island, a major North Vietnamese infiltration staging point, became the tripwire that set off the August 2 confrontation in the Gulf of Tonkin. Sign up to get updates about new releases and event invitations. (2021, February 16). Or purchase a subscription for unlimited access to real news you can count on. A joint resolution of Congress dated August 7, 1964, gave the president authority to increase U.S. involvement in the war between North and South Vietnam and served as the legal basis for escalations in the Johnson and Nixon administrations that likely dwarfed what most Americans could have imagined in August 1964. Everything went smoothly until the early hours of 2 August, when intelligence picked up indications that the North Vietnamese Navy had moved additional Swatows into the vicinity of Hon Me and Hon Nieu Islands and ordered them to prepare for battle. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. In Saigon, General William C. Westmoreland, the new commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), approved of the plan, and SOG began testing 81-mm mortars, 4.5-inch rockets, and recoilless rifles aboard the boats. . We have no intention of yielding to pressure. If there had been any doubt before about whose hand was behind the raids, surely there was none now. McNamara took advantage of Morses imprecision and concentrated on the senators connection between 34A and Desoto, squirming away from the issue of U.S. involvement in covert missions by claiming that the Maddox "was not informed of, was not aware [of], had no evidence of, and so far as I know today had no knowledge of any possible South Vietnamese actions in connection with the two islands Senator Morse referred to." 1. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. Scattered small-arms sent tracers toward the commandos, but no one was hurt. LBJ's War is a new, limited-edition podcast that unearths previously unheard audio that helps us better understand the course of the Vietnam War and how Lyndon Johnson found himself where he did. This along with flawed signals intelligence from the National Security Agency led Johnson to order retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. WebOn August 7, 1964, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing President Johnson to take any measures he believed were necessary to retaliate and to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia. The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. 12. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. In response, the North Vietnamese built up their naval presence around the offshore islands. Two days later, August 4, Maddox returned to the area, supported by the destroyer Turner Joy (DD-951). But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. CIA Bulletin, 3 August 1964 (see Edward J. Marolda and Oscar P. Fitzgerald, The United States Navy and the Vietnam Conflict: From Military Assistance to Combat, 1959-1965 [Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1986], p. 422). The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. The first Desoto Mission was conducted by USS Craig (DD-885) in March 1964. This mission coincided with several 34A attacks, including an Aug. 1 raid on Hon Me and Hon Ngu Islands.
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